Add support for kTLS

Reference: https://gitlab.com/go-extension/tls
This commit is contained in:
世界
2025-09-07 21:03:32 +08:00
parent f84129ca79
commit 107f92381b
59 changed files with 2682 additions and 222 deletions

106
common/ktls/ktls.go Normal file
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//go:build linux && go1.25 && !without_badtls
package ktls
import (
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"io"
"net"
"os"
"syscall"
"github.com/sagernet/sing-box/common/badtls"
E "github.com/sagernet/sing/common/exceptions"
"github.com/sagernet/sing/common/logger"
N "github.com/sagernet/sing/common/network"
aTLS "github.com/sagernet/sing/common/tls"
)
type Conn struct {
aTLS.Conn
ctx context.Context
logger logger.ContextLogger
conn net.Conn
rawConn *badtls.RawConn
syscallConn syscall.Conn
rawSyscallConn syscall.RawConn
readWaitOptions N.ReadWaitOptions
kernelTx bool
kernelRx bool
}
func NewConn(ctx context.Context, logger logger.ContextLogger, conn aTLS.Conn, txOffload, rxOffload bool) (aTLS.Conn, error) {
err := Load()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
syscallConn, isSyscallConn := N.CastReader[interface {
io.Reader
syscall.Conn
}](conn.NetConn())
if !isSyscallConn {
return nil, os.ErrInvalid
}
rawSyscallConn, err := syscallConn.SyscallConn()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
rawConn, err := badtls.NewRawConn(conn)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if *rawConn.Vers != tls.VersionTLS13 {
return nil, os.ErrInvalid
}
for rawConn.RawInput.Len() > 0 {
err = rawConn.ReadRecord()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
for rawConn.Hand.Len() > 0 {
err = rawConn.HandlePostHandshakeMessage()
if err != nil {
return nil, E.Cause(err, "handle post-handshake messages")
}
}
}
kConn := &Conn{
Conn: conn,
ctx: ctx,
logger: logger,
conn: conn.NetConn(),
rawConn: rawConn,
syscallConn: syscallConn,
rawSyscallConn: rawSyscallConn,
}
err = kConn.setupKernel(txOffload, rxOffload)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return kConn, nil
}
func (c *Conn) Upstream() any {
return c.Conn
}
func (c *Conn) SyscallConnForRead() syscall.Conn {
if !c.kernelRx {
return nil
}
if !*c.rawConn.IsClient {
c.logger.WarnContext(c.ctx, "ktls: RX splice is unavailable on the server size, since it will cause an unknown failure")
return nil
}
c.logger.DebugContext(c.ctx, "ktls: RX splice requested")
return c.syscallConn
}
func (c *Conn) SyscallConnForWrite() syscall.Conn {
if !c.kernelTx {
return nil
}
c.logger.DebugContext(c.ctx, "ktls: TX splice requested")
return c.syscallConn
}

80
common/ktls/ktls_alert.go Normal file
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// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build linux && go1.25 && !without_badtls
package ktls
import (
"crypto/tls"
"net"
)
const (
// alert level
alertLevelWarning = 1
alertLevelError = 2
)
const (
alertCloseNotify = 0
alertUnexpectedMessage = 10
alertBadRecordMAC = 20
alertDecryptionFailed = 21
alertRecordOverflow = 22
alertDecompressionFailure = 30
alertHandshakeFailure = 40
alertBadCertificate = 42
alertUnsupportedCertificate = 43
alertCertificateRevoked = 44
alertCertificateExpired = 45
alertCertificateUnknown = 46
alertIllegalParameter = 47
alertUnknownCA = 48
alertAccessDenied = 49
alertDecodeError = 50
alertDecryptError = 51
alertExportRestriction = 60
alertProtocolVersion = 70
alertInsufficientSecurity = 71
alertInternalError = 80
alertInappropriateFallback = 86
alertUserCanceled = 90
alertNoRenegotiation = 100
alertMissingExtension = 109
alertUnsupportedExtension = 110
alertCertificateUnobtainable = 111
alertUnrecognizedName = 112
alertBadCertificateStatusResponse = 113
alertBadCertificateHashValue = 114
alertUnknownPSKIdentity = 115
alertCertificateRequired = 116
alertNoApplicationProtocol = 120
alertECHRequired = 121
)
func (c *Conn) sendAlertLocked(err uint8) error {
switch err {
case alertNoRenegotiation, alertCloseNotify:
c.rawConn.Tmp[0] = alertLevelWarning
default:
c.rawConn.Tmp[0] = alertLevelError
}
c.rawConn.Tmp[1] = byte(err)
_, writeErr := c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeAlert, c.rawConn.Tmp[0:2])
if err == alertCloseNotify {
// closeNotify is a special case in that it isn't an error.
return writeErr
}
return c.rawConn.Out.SetErrorLocked(&net.OpError{Op: "local error", Err: tls.AlertError(err)})
}
// sendAlert sends a TLS alert message.
func (c *Conn) sendAlert(err uint8) error {
c.rawConn.Out.Lock()
defer c.rawConn.Out.Unlock()
return c.sendAlertLocked(err)
}

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// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build linux && go1.25 && !without_badtls
package ktls
import (
"crypto/tls"
"unsafe"
"github.com/sagernet/sing-box/common/badtls"
)
type kernelCryptoCipherType uint16
const (
TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128 kernelCryptoCipherType = 51
TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 8
TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_KEY_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 16
TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 4
TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_TAG_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 16
TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 8
TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256 kernelCryptoCipherType = 52
TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_IV_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 8
TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_KEY_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 32
TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_SALT_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 4
TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_TAG_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 16
TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_REC_SEQ_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 8
TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128 kernelCryptoCipherType = 53
TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_IV_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 8
TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_KEY_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 16
TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_SALT_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 4
TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_TAG_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 16
TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 8
TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 kernelCryptoCipherType = 54
TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_IV_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 12
TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_KEY_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 32
TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SALT_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 0
TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_TAG_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 16
TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_REC_SEQ_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 8
// TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM kernelCryptoCipherType = 55
// TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM_IV_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 8
// TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM_KEY_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 16
// TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM_SALT_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 4
// TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM_TAG_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 16
// TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM_REC_SEQ_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 8
// TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM kernelCryptoCipherType = 56
// TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM_IV_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 8
// TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM_KEY_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 16
// TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM_SALT_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 4
// TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM_TAG_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 16
// TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM_REC_SEQ_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 8
TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_128 kernelCryptoCipherType = 57
TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_128_IV_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 8
TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_128_KEY_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 16
TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 4
TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_128_TAG_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 16
TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 8
TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_256 kernelCryptoCipherType = 58
TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_256_IV_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 8
TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_256_KEY_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 32
TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_256_SALT_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 4
TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_256_TAG_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 16
TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_256_REC_SEQ_SIZE kernelCryptoCipherType = 8
)
type kernelCrypto interface {
String() string
}
type kernelCryptoInfo struct {
version uint16
cipher_type kernelCryptoCipherType
}
var _ kernelCrypto = &kernelCryptoAES128GCM{}
type kernelCryptoAES128GCM struct {
kernelCryptoInfo
iv [TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE]byte
key [TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_KEY_SIZE]byte
salt [TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE]byte
rec_seq [TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE]byte
}
func (crypto *kernelCryptoAES128GCM) String() string {
crypto.cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128
return string((*[unsafe.Sizeof(*crypto)]byte)(unsafe.Pointer(crypto))[:])
}
var _ kernelCrypto = &kernelCryptoAES256GCM{}
type kernelCryptoAES256GCM struct {
kernelCryptoInfo
iv [TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_IV_SIZE]byte
key [TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_KEY_SIZE]byte
salt [TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_SALT_SIZE]byte
rec_seq [TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_REC_SEQ_SIZE]byte
}
func (crypto *kernelCryptoAES256GCM) String() string {
crypto.cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256
return string((*[unsafe.Sizeof(*crypto)]byte)(unsafe.Pointer(crypto))[:])
}
var _ kernelCrypto = &kernelCryptoAES128CCM{}
type kernelCryptoAES128CCM struct {
kernelCryptoInfo
iv [TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_IV_SIZE]byte
key [TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_KEY_SIZE]byte
salt [TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_SALT_SIZE]byte
rec_seq [TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE]byte
}
func (crypto *kernelCryptoAES128CCM) String() string {
crypto.cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128
return string((*[unsafe.Sizeof(*crypto)]byte)(unsafe.Pointer(crypto))[:])
}
var _ kernelCrypto = &kernelCryptoChacha20Poly1035{}
type kernelCryptoChacha20Poly1035 struct {
kernelCryptoInfo
iv [TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_IV_SIZE]byte
key [TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_KEY_SIZE]byte
salt [TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SALT_SIZE]byte
rec_seq [TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_REC_SEQ_SIZE]byte
}
func (crypto *kernelCryptoChacha20Poly1035) String() string {
crypto.cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305
return string((*[unsafe.Sizeof(*crypto)]byte)(unsafe.Pointer(crypto))[:])
}
// var _ kernelCrypto = &kernelCryptoSM4GCM{}
// type kernelCryptoSM4GCM struct {
// kernelCryptoInfo
// iv [TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM_IV_SIZE]byte
// key [TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM_KEY_SIZE]byte
// salt [TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM_SALT_SIZE]byte
// rec_seq [TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM_REC_SEQ_SIZE]byte
// }
// func (crypto *kernelCryptoSM4GCM) String() string {
// crypto.cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM
// return string((*[unsafe.Sizeof(*crypto)]byte)(unsafe.Pointer(crypto))[:])
// }
// var _ kernelCrypto = &kernelCryptoSM4CCM{}
// type kernelCryptoSM4CCM struct {
// kernelCryptoInfo
// iv [TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM_IV_SIZE]byte
// key [TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM_KEY_SIZE]byte
// salt [TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM_SALT_SIZE]byte
// rec_seq [TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM_REC_SEQ_SIZE]byte
// }
// func (crypto *kernelCryptoSM4CCM) String() string {
// crypto.cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM
// return string((*[unsafe.Sizeof(*crypto)]byte)(unsafe.Pointer(crypto))[:])
// }
var _ kernelCrypto = &kernelCryptoARIA128GCM{}
type kernelCryptoARIA128GCM struct {
kernelCryptoInfo
iv [TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_128_IV_SIZE]byte
key [TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_128_KEY_SIZE]byte
salt [TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE]byte
rec_seq [TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE]byte
}
func (crypto *kernelCryptoARIA128GCM) String() string {
crypto.cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_128
return string((*[unsafe.Sizeof(*crypto)]byte)(unsafe.Pointer(crypto))[:])
}
var _ kernelCrypto = &kernelCryptoARIA256GCM{}
type kernelCryptoARIA256GCM struct {
kernelCryptoInfo
iv [TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_256_IV_SIZE]byte
key [TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_256_KEY_SIZE]byte
salt [TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_256_SALT_SIZE]byte
rec_seq [TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_256_REC_SEQ_SIZE]byte
}
func (crypto *kernelCryptoARIA256GCM) String() string {
crypto.cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_256
return string((*[unsafe.Sizeof(*crypto)]byte)(unsafe.Pointer(crypto))[:])
}
func kernelCipher(kernel *Support, hc *badtls.RawHalfConn, cipherSuite uint16, isRX bool) kernelCrypto {
if !kernel.TLS {
return nil
}
switch *hc.Version {
case tls.VersionTLS12:
if isRX && !kernel.TLS_Version13_RX {
return nil
}
case tls.VersionTLS13:
if !kernel.TLS_Version13 {
return nil
}
if isRX && !kernel.TLS_Version13_RX {
return nil
}
default:
return nil
}
var key, iv []byte
if *hc.Version == tls.VersionTLS13 {
key, iv = trafficKey(cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(cipherSuite), *hc.TrafficSecret)
/*if isRX {
key, iv = trafficKey(cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(cipherSuite), keyLog.RemoteTrafficSecret)
} else {
key, iv = trafficKey(cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(cipherSuite), keyLog.TrafficSecret)
}*/
} else {
// csPtr := cipherSuiteByID(cipherSuite)
// keysFromMasterSecret(*hc.Version, csPtr, keyLog.Secret, keyLog.Random)
return nil
}
switch cipherSuite {
case tls.TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
crypto := new(kernelCryptoAES128GCM)
crypto.version = *hc.Version
copy(crypto.key[:], key)
copy(crypto.iv[:], iv[4:])
copy(crypto.salt[:], iv[:4])
crypto.rec_seq = *hc.Seq
return crypto
case tls.TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
if !kernel.TLS_AES_256_GCM {
return nil
}
crypto := new(kernelCryptoAES256GCM)
crypto.version = *hc.Version
copy(crypto.key[:], key)
copy(crypto.iv[:], iv[4:])
copy(crypto.salt[:], iv[:4])
crypto.rec_seq = *hc.Seq
return crypto
//case tls.TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256, tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256, tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256:
// if !kernel.TLS_AES_128_CCM {
// return nil
// }
//
// crypto := new(kernelCryptoAES128CCM)
//
// crypto.version = *hc.Version
// copy(crypto.key[:], key)
// copy(crypto.iv[:], iv[4:])
// copy(crypto.salt[:], iv[:4])
// crypto.rec_seq = *hc.Seq
//
// return crypto
case tls.TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:
if !kernel.TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305 {
return nil
}
crypto := new(kernelCryptoChacha20Poly1035)
crypto.version = *hc.Version
copy(crypto.key[:], key)
copy(crypto.iv[:], iv)
crypto.rec_seq = *hc.Seq
return crypto
//case tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256:
// if !kernel.TLS_ARIA_GCM {
// return nil
// }
//
// crypto := new(kernelCryptoARIA128GCM)
//
// crypto.version = *hc.Version
// copy(crypto.key[:], key)
// copy(crypto.iv[:], iv[4:])
// copy(crypto.salt[:], iv[:4])
// crypto.rec_seq = *hc.Seq
//
// return crypto
//case tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384:
// if !kernel.TLS_ARIA_GCM {
// return nil
// }
//
// crypto := new(kernelCryptoARIA256GCM)
//
// crypto.version = *hc.Version
// copy(crypto.key[:], key)
// copy(crypto.iv[:], iv[4:])
// copy(crypto.salt[:], iv[:4])
// crypto.rec_seq = *hc.Seq
//
// return crypto
default:
return nil
}
}

67
common/ktls/ktls_close.go Normal file
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// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build linux && go1.25 && !without_badtls
package ktls
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"time"
)
func (c *Conn) Close() error {
if !c.kernelTx {
return c.Conn.Close()
}
// Interlock with Conn.Write above.
var x int32
for {
x = c.rawConn.ActiveCall.Load()
if x&1 != 0 {
return net.ErrClosed
}
if c.rawConn.ActiveCall.CompareAndSwap(x, x|1) {
break
}
}
if x != 0 {
// io.Writer and io.Closer should not be used concurrently.
// If Close is called while a Write is currently in-flight,
// interpret that as a sign that this Close is really just
// being used to break the Write and/or clean up resources and
// avoid sending the alertCloseNotify, which may block
// waiting on handshakeMutex or the c.out mutex.
return c.conn.Close()
}
var alertErr error
if c.rawConn.IsHandshakeComplete.Load() {
if err := c.closeNotify(); err != nil {
alertErr = fmt.Errorf("tls: failed to send closeNotify alert (but connection was closed anyway): %w", err)
}
}
if err := c.conn.Close(); err != nil {
return err
}
return alertErr
}
func (c *Conn) closeNotify() error {
c.rawConn.Out.Lock()
defer c.rawConn.Out.Unlock()
if !*c.rawConn.CloseNotifySent {
// Set a Write Deadline to prevent possibly blocking forever.
c.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now().Add(time.Second * 5))
*c.rawConn.CloseNotifyErr = c.sendAlertLocked(alertCloseNotify)
*c.rawConn.CloseNotifySent = true
// Any subsequent writes will fail.
c.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now())
}
return *c.rawConn.CloseNotifyErr
}

24
common/ktls/ktls_const.go Normal file
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// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build linux && go1.25 && !without_badtls
package ktls
const (
maxPlaintext = 16384 // maximum plaintext payload length
maxCiphertext = 16384 + 2048 // maximum ciphertext payload length
maxCiphertextTLS13 = 16384 + 256 // maximum ciphertext length in TLS 1.3
recordHeaderLen = 5 // record header length
maxHandshake = 65536 // maximum handshake we support (protocol max is 16 MB)
maxHandshakeCertificateMsg = 262144 // maximum certificate message size (256 KiB)
maxUselessRecords = 16 // maximum number of consecutive non-advancing records
)
const (
recordTypeChangeCipherSpec = 20
recordTypeAlert = 21
recordTypeHandshake = 22
recordTypeApplicationData = 23
)

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// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build linux && go1.25 && !without_badtls
package ktls
import (
"fmt"
"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
)
// The marshalingFunction type is an adapter to allow the use of ordinary
// functions as cryptobyte.MarshalingValue.
type marshalingFunction func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) error
func (f marshalingFunction) Marshal(b *cryptobyte.Builder) error {
return f(b)
}
// addBytesWithLength appends a sequence of bytes to the cryptobyte.Builder. If
// the length of the sequence is not the value specified, it produces an error.
func addBytesWithLength(b *cryptobyte.Builder, v []byte, n int) {
b.AddValue(marshalingFunction(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) error {
if len(v) != n {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid value length: expected %d, got %d", n, len(v))
}
b.AddBytes(v)
return nil
}))
}
// addUint64 appends a big-endian, 64-bit value to the cryptobyte.Builder.
func addUint64(b *cryptobyte.Builder, v uint64) {
b.AddUint32(uint32(v >> 32))
b.AddUint32(uint32(v))
}
// readUint64 decodes a big-endian, 64-bit value into out and advances over it.
// It reports whether the read was successful.
func readUint64(s *cryptobyte.String, out *uint64) bool {
var hi, lo uint32
if !s.ReadUint32(&hi) || !s.ReadUint32(&lo) {
return false
}
*out = uint64(hi)<<32 | uint64(lo)
return true
}
// readUint8LengthPrefixed acts like s.ReadUint8LengthPrefixed, but targets a
// []byte instead of a cryptobyte.String.
func readUint8LengthPrefixed(s *cryptobyte.String, out *[]byte) bool {
return s.ReadUint8LengthPrefixed((*cryptobyte.String)(out))
}
// readUint16LengthPrefixed acts like s.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed, but targets a
// []byte instead of a cryptobyte.String.
func readUint16LengthPrefixed(s *cryptobyte.String, out *[]byte) bool {
return s.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed((*cryptobyte.String)(out))
}
// readUint24LengthPrefixed acts like s.ReadUint24LengthPrefixed, but targets a
// []byte instead of a cryptobyte.String.
func readUint24LengthPrefixed(s *cryptobyte.String, out *[]byte) bool {
return s.ReadUint24LengthPrefixed((*cryptobyte.String)(out))
}
type keyUpdateMsg struct {
updateRequested bool
}
func (m *keyUpdateMsg) marshal() ([]byte, error) {
var b cryptobyte.Builder
b.AddUint8(typeKeyUpdate)
b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
if m.updateRequested {
b.AddUint8(1)
} else {
b.AddUint8(0)
}
})
return b.Bytes()
}
func (m *keyUpdateMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
s := cryptobyte.String(data)
var updateRequested uint8
if !s.Skip(4) || // message type and uint24 length field
!s.ReadUint8(&updateRequested) || !s.Empty() {
return false
}
switch updateRequested {
case 0:
m.updateRequested = false
case 1:
m.updateRequested = true
default:
return false
}
return true
}
// TLS handshake message types.
const (
typeHelloRequest uint8 = 0
typeClientHello uint8 = 1
typeServerHello uint8 = 2
typeNewSessionTicket uint8 = 4
typeEndOfEarlyData uint8 = 5
typeEncryptedExtensions uint8 = 8
typeCertificate uint8 = 11
typeServerKeyExchange uint8 = 12
typeCertificateRequest uint8 = 13
typeServerHelloDone uint8 = 14
typeCertificateVerify uint8 = 15
typeClientKeyExchange uint8 = 16
typeFinished uint8 = 20
typeCertificateStatus uint8 = 22
typeKeyUpdate uint8 = 24
typeCompressedCertificate uint8 = 25
typeMessageHash uint8 = 254 // synthetic message
)
// TLS compression types.
const (
compressionNone uint8 = 0
)
// TLS extension numbers
const (
extensionServerName uint16 = 0
extensionStatusRequest uint16 = 5
extensionSupportedCurves uint16 = 10 // supported_groups in TLS 1.3, see RFC 8446, Section 4.2.7
extensionSupportedPoints uint16 = 11
extensionSignatureAlgorithms uint16 = 13
extensionALPN uint16 = 16
extensionSCT uint16 = 18
extensionPadding uint16 = 21
extensionExtendedMasterSecret uint16 = 23
extensionCompressCertificate uint16 = 27 // compress_certificate in TLS 1.3
extensionSessionTicket uint16 = 35
extensionPreSharedKey uint16 = 41
extensionEarlyData uint16 = 42
extensionSupportedVersions uint16 = 43
extensionCookie uint16 = 44
extensionPSKModes uint16 = 45
extensionCertificateAuthorities uint16 = 47
extensionSignatureAlgorithmsCert uint16 = 50
extensionKeyShare uint16 = 51
extensionQUICTransportParameters uint16 = 57
extensionALPS uint16 = 17513
extensionRenegotiationInfo uint16 = 0xff01
extensionECHOuterExtensions uint16 = 0xfd00
extensionEncryptedClientHello uint16 = 0xfe0d
)
type handshakeMessage interface {
marshal() ([]byte, error)
unmarshal([]byte) bool
}
type newSessionTicketMsgTLS13 struct {
lifetime uint32
ageAdd uint32
nonce []byte
label []byte
maxEarlyData uint32
}
func (m *newSessionTicketMsgTLS13) marshal() ([]byte, error) {
var b cryptobyte.Builder
b.AddUint8(typeNewSessionTicket)
b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddUint32(m.lifetime)
b.AddUint32(m.ageAdd)
b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(m.nonce)
})
b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(m.label)
})
b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
if m.maxEarlyData > 0 {
b.AddUint16(extensionEarlyData)
b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddUint32(m.maxEarlyData)
})
}
})
})
return b.Bytes()
}
func (m *newSessionTicketMsgTLS13) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
*m = newSessionTicketMsgTLS13{}
s := cryptobyte.String(data)
var extensions cryptobyte.String
if !s.Skip(4) || // message type and uint24 length field
!s.ReadUint32(&m.lifetime) ||
!s.ReadUint32(&m.ageAdd) ||
!readUint8LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.nonce) ||
!readUint16LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.label) ||
!s.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extensions) ||
!s.Empty() {
return false
}
for !extensions.Empty() {
var extension uint16
var extData cryptobyte.String
if !extensions.ReadUint16(&extension) ||
!extensions.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extData) {
return false
}
switch extension {
case extensionEarlyData:
if !extData.ReadUint32(&m.maxEarlyData) {
return false
}
default:
// Ignore unknown extensions.
continue
}
if !extData.Empty() {
return false
}
}
return true
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build linux && go1.25 && !without_badtls
package ktls
import (
"crypto/tls"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
)
// handlePostHandshakeMessage processes a handshake message arrived after the
// handshake is complete. Up to TLS 1.2, it indicates the start of a renegotiation.
func (c *Conn) handlePostHandshakeMessage() error {
if *c.rawConn.Vers != tls.VersionTLS13 {
return errors.New("ktls: kernel does not support TLS 1.2 renegotiation")
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
//c.retryCount++
//if c.retryCount > maxUselessRecords {
// c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
// return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: too many non-advancing records"))
//}
switch msg := msg.(type) {
case *newSessionTicketMsgTLS13:
// return errors.New("ktls: received new session ticket")
return nil
case *keyUpdateMsg:
return c.handleKeyUpdate(msg)
}
// The QUIC layer is supposed to treat an unexpected post-handshake CertificateRequest
// as a QUIC-level PROTOCOL_VIOLATION error (RFC 9001, Section 4.4). Returning an
// unexpected_message alert here doesn't provide it with enough information to distinguish
// this condition from other unexpected messages. This is probably fine.
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return fmt.Errorf("tls: received unexpected handshake message of type %T", msg)
}
func (c *Conn) handleKeyUpdate(keyUpdate *keyUpdateMsg) error {
//if c.quic != nil {
// c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
// return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: received unexpected key update message"))
//}
cipherSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(*c.rawConn.CipherSuite)
if cipherSuite == nil {
return c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertInternalError))
}
newSecret := nextTrafficSecret(cipherSuite, *c.rawConn.In.TrafficSecret)
c.rawConn.In.SetTrafficSecret(cipherSuite, 0 /*tls.QUICEncryptionLevelInitial*/, newSecret)
err := c.resetupRX()
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("ktls: resetupRX failed: %w", err))
}
if keyUpdate.updateRequested {
c.rawConn.Out.Lock()
defer c.rawConn.Out.Unlock()
resetup, err := c.resetupTX()
if err != nil {
c.sendAlertLocked(alertInternalError)
return c.rawConn.Out.SetErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("ktls: resetupTX failed: %w", err))
}
msg := &keyUpdateMsg{}
msgBytes, err := msg.marshal()
if err != nil {
return err
}
_, err = c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeHandshake, msgBytes)
if err != nil {
// Surface the error at the next write.
c.rawConn.Out.SetErrorLocked(err)
return nil
}
newSecret := nextTrafficSecret(cipherSuite, *c.rawConn.Out.TrafficSecret)
c.rawConn.Out.SetTrafficSecret(cipherSuite, 0 /*QUICEncryptionLevelInitial*/, newSecret)
err = resetup()
if err != nil {
return c.rawConn.Out.SetErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("ktls: resetupTX failed: %w", err))
}
}
return nil
}
func (c *Conn) readHandshakeBytes(n int) error {
//if c.quic != nil {
// return c.quicReadHandshakeBytes(n)
//}
for c.rawConn.Hand.Len() < n {
if err := c.readRecord(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func (c *Conn) readHandshake(transcript io.Writer) (any, error) {
if err := c.readHandshakeBytes(4); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
data := c.rawConn.Hand.Bytes()
maxHandshakeSize := maxHandshake
// hasVers indicates we're past the first message, forcing someone trying to
// make us just allocate a large buffer to at least do the initial part of
// the handshake first.
//if c.haveVers && data[0] == typeCertificate {
// Since certificate messages are likely to be the only messages that
// can be larger than maxHandshake, we use a special limit for just
// those messages.
//maxHandshakeSize = maxHandshakeCertificateMsg
//}
n := int(data[1])<<16 | int(data[2])<<8 | int(data[3])
if n > maxHandshakeSize {
c.sendAlertLocked(alertInternalError)
return nil, c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("tls: handshake message of length %d bytes exceeds maximum of %d bytes", n, maxHandshakeSize))
}
if err := c.readHandshakeBytes(4 + n); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
data = c.rawConn.Hand.Next(4 + n)
return c.unmarshalHandshakeMessage(data, transcript)
}
func (c *Conn) unmarshalHandshakeMessage(data []byte, transcript io.Writer) (any, error) {
var m handshakeMessage
switch data[0] {
case typeNewSessionTicket:
if *c.rawConn.Vers == tls.VersionTLS13 {
m = new(newSessionTicketMsgTLS13)
} else {
return nil, os.ErrInvalid
}
case typeKeyUpdate:
m = new(keyUpdateMsg)
default:
return nil, c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
}
// The handshake message unmarshalers
// expect to be able to keep references to data,
// so pass in a fresh copy that won't be overwritten.
data = append([]byte(nil), data...)
if !m.unmarshal(data) {
return nil, c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError))
}
if transcript != nil {
transcript.Write(data)
}
return m, nil
}

329
common/ktls/ktls_linux.go Normal file
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//go:build linux && go1.25 && !without_badtls
package ktls
import (
"crypto/tls"
"errors"
"io"
"os"
"strings"
"sync"
"syscall"
"unsafe"
"github.com/sagernet/sing-box/common/badversion"
"github.com/sagernet/sing/common/control"
E "github.com/sagernet/sing/common/exceptions"
"github.com/sagernet/sing/common/shell"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
// mod from https://gitlab.com/go-extension/tls
const (
TLS_TX = 1
TLS_RX = 2
TLS_TX_ZEROCOPY_RO = 3 // TX zerocopy (only sendfile now)
TLS_RX_EXPECT_NO_PAD = 4 // Attempt opportunistic zero-copy, TLS 1.3 only
TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE = 1
TLS_GET_RECORD_TYPE = 2
)
type Support struct {
TLS, TLS_RX bool
TLS_Version13, TLS_Version13_RX bool
TLS_TX_ZEROCOPY bool
TLS_RX_NOPADDING bool
TLS_AES_256_GCM bool
TLS_AES_128_CCM bool
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305 bool
TLS_SM4 bool
TLS_ARIA_GCM bool
TLS_Version13_KeyUpdate bool
}
var KernelSupport = sync.OnceValues(func() (*Support, error) {
var uname unix.Utsname
err := unix.Uname(&uname)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
kernelVersion := badversion.Parse(strings.Trim(string(uname.Release[:]), "\x00"))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var support Support
switch {
case kernelVersion.GreaterThanOrEqual(badversion.Version{Major: 6, Minor: 14}):
support.TLS_Version13_KeyUpdate = true
fallthrough
case kernelVersion.GreaterThanOrEqual(badversion.Version{Major: 6, Minor: 1}):
support.TLS_ARIA_GCM = true
fallthrough
case kernelVersion.GreaterThanOrEqual(badversion.Version{Major: 6}):
support.TLS_Version13_RX = true
support.TLS_RX_NOPADDING = true
fallthrough
case kernelVersion.GreaterThanOrEqual(badversion.Version{Major: 5, Minor: 19}):
support.TLS_TX_ZEROCOPY = true
fallthrough
case kernelVersion.GreaterThanOrEqual(badversion.Version{Major: 5, Minor: 16}):
support.TLS_SM4 = true
fallthrough
case kernelVersion.GreaterThanOrEqual(badversion.Version{Major: 5, Minor: 11}):
support.TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305 = true
fallthrough
case kernelVersion.GreaterThanOrEqual(badversion.Version{Major: 5, Minor: 2}):
support.TLS_AES_128_CCM = true
fallthrough
case kernelVersion.GreaterThanOrEqual(badversion.Version{Major: 5, Minor: 1}):
support.TLS_AES_256_GCM = true
support.TLS_Version13 = true
fallthrough
case kernelVersion.GreaterThanOrEqual(badversion.Version{Major: 4, Minor: 17}):
support.TLS_RX = true
fallthrough
case kernelVersion.GreaterThanOrEqual(badversion.Version{Major: 4, Minor: 13}):
support.TLS = true
}
if support.TLS && support.TLS_Version13 {
_, err := os.Stat("/sys/module/tls")
if err != nil {
if os.Getuid() == 0 {
output, err := shell.Exec("modprobe", "tls").Read()
if err != nil {
return nil, E.Extend(E.Cause(err, "modprobe tls"), output)
}
} else {
return nil, E.New("ktls: kernel TLS module not loaded")
}
}
}
return &support, nil
})
func Load() error {
support, err := KernelSupport()
if err != nil {
return E.Cause(err, "ktls: check availability")
}
if !support.TLS || !support.TLS_Version13 {
return E.New("ktls: kernel does not support TLS 1.3")
}
return nil
}
func (c *Conn) setupKernel(txOffload, rxOffload bool) error {
if !txOffload && !rxOffload {
return os.ErrInvalid
}
support, err := KernelSupport()
if err != nil {
return E.Cause(err, "check availability")
}
if !support.TLS || !support.TLS_Version13 {
return E.New("kernel does not support TLS 1.3")
}
c.rawConn.Out.Lock()
defer c.rawConn.Out.Unlock()
err = control.Raw(c.rawSyscallConn, func(fd uintptr) error {
return syscall.SetsockoptString(int(fd), unix.SOL_TCP, unix.TCP_ULP, "tls")
})
if err != nil {
return os.NewSyscallError("setsockopt", err)
}
if txOffload {
txCrypto := kernelCipher(support, c.rawConn.Out, *c.rawConn.CipherSuite, false)
if txCrypto == nil {
return E.New("unsupported cipher suite")
}
err = control.Raw(c.rawSyscallConn, func(fd uintptr) error {
return syscall.SetsockoptString(int(fd), unix.SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, txCrypto.String())
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
if support.TLS_TX_ZEROCOPY {
err = control.Raw(c.rawSyscallConn, func(fd uintptr) error {
return syscall.SetsockoptInt(int(fd), unix.SOL_TLS, TLS_TX_ZEROCOPY_RO, 1)
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
c.kernelTx = true
c.logger.DebugContext(c.ctx, "ktls: kernel TLS TX enabled")
}
if rxOffload {
rxCrypto := kernelCipher(support, c.rawConn.In, *c.rawConn.CipherSuite, true)
if rxCrypto == nil {
return E.New("unsupported cipher suite")
}
err = control.Raw(c.rawSyscallConn, func(fd uintptr) error {
return syscall.SetsockoptString(int(fd), unix.SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, rxCrypto.String())
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
if *c.rawConn.Vers >= tls.VersionTLS13 && support.TLS_RX_NOPADDING {
err = control.Raw(c.rawSyscallConn, func(fd uintptr) error {
return syscall.SetsockoptInt(int(fd), unix.SOL_TLS, TLS_RX_EXPECT_NO_PAD, 1)
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
c.kernelRx = true
c.logger.DebugContext(c.ctx, "ktls: kernel TLS RX enabled")
}
return nil
}
func (c *Conn) resetupTX() (func() error, error) {
if !c.kernelTx {
return nil, nil
}
support, err := KernelSupport()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if !support.TLS_Version13_KeyUpdate {
return nil, errors.New("ktls: kernel does not support rekey")
}
txCrypto := kernelCipher(support, c.rawConn.Out, *c.rawConn.CipherSuite, false)
if txCrypto == nil {
return nil, errors.New("ktls: set kernelCipher on unsupported tls session")
}
return func() error {
return control.Raw(c.rawSyscallConn, func(fd uintptr) error {
return syscall.SetsockoptString(int(fd), unix.SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, txCrypto.String())
})
}, nil
}
func (c *Conn) resetupRX() error {
if !c.kernelRx {
return nil
}
support, err := KernelSupport()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !support.TLS_Version13_KeyUpdate {
return errors.New("ktls: kernel does not support rekey")
}
rxCrypto := kernelCipher(support, c.rawConn.In, *c.rawConn.CipherSuite, true)
if rxCrypto == nil {
return errors.New("ktls: set kernelCipher on unsupported tls session")
}
return control.Raw(c.rawSyscallConn, func(fd uintptr) error {
return syscall.SetsockoptString(int(fd), unix.SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, rxCrypto.String())
})
}
func (c *Conn) readKernelRecord() (uint8, []byte, error) {
if c.rawConn.RawInput.Len() < maxPlaintext {
c.rawConn.RawInput.Grow(maxPlaintext - c.rawConn.RawInput.Len())
}
data := c.rawConn.RawInput.Bytes()[:maxPlaintext]
// cmsg for record type
buffer := make([]byte, unix.CmsgSpace(1))
cmsg := (*unix.Cmsghdr)(unsafe.Pointer(&buffer[0]))
cmsg.SetLen(unix.CmsgLen(1))
var iov unix.Iovec
iov.Base = &data[0]
iov.SetLen(len(data))
var msg unix.Msghdr
msg.Control = &buffer[0]
msg.Controllen = cmsg.Len
msg.Iov = &iov
msg.Iovlen = 1
var n int
var err error
er := c.rawSyscallConn.Read(func(fd uintptr) bool {
n, err = recvmsg(int(fd), &msg, 0)
return err != unix.EAGAIN
})
if er != nil {
return 0, nil, er
}
switch err {
case nil:
case syscall.EINVAL:
return 0, nil, c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion))
case syscall.EMSGSIZE:
return 0, nil, c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertRecordOverflow))
case syscall.EBADMSG:
return 0, nil, c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError))
default:
return 0, nil, err
}
if n <= 0 {
return 0, nil, io.EOF
}
if cmsg.Level == unix.SOL_TLS && cmsg.Type == TLS_GET_RECORD_TYPE {
typ := buffer[unix.CmsgLen(0)]
return typ, data[:n], nil
}
return recordTypeApplicationData, data[:n], nil
}
func (c *Conn) writeKernelRecord(typ uint16, data []byte) (int, error) {
if typ == recordTypeApplicationData {
return c.conn.Write(data)
}
// cmsg for record type
buffer := make([]byte, unix.CmsgSpace(1))
cmsg := (*unix.Cmsghdr)(unsafe.Pointer(&buffer[0]))
cmsg.SetLen(unix.CmsgLen(1))
buffer[unix.CmsgLen(0)] = byte(typ)
cmsg.Level = unix.SOL_TLS
cmsg.Type = TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE
var iov unix.Iovec
iov.Base = &data[0]
iov.SetLen(len(data))
var msg unix.Msghdr
msg.Control = &buffer[0]
msg.Controllen = cmsg.Len
msg.Iov = &iov
msg.Iovlen = 1
var n int
var err error
ew := c.rawSyscallConn.Write(func(fd uintptr) bool {
n, err = sendmsg(int(fd), &msg, 0)
return err != unix.EAGAIN
})
if ew != nil {
return 0, ew
}
return n, err
}
//go:linkname recvmsg golang.org/x/sys/unix.recvmsg
func recvmsg(fd int, msg *unix.Msghdr, flags int) (n int, err error)
//go:linkname sendmsg golang.org/x/sys/unix.sendmsg
func sendmsg(fd int, msg *unix.Msghdr, flags int) (n int, err error)

24
common/ktls/ktls_prf.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build linux && go1.25 && !without_badtls
package ktls
import "unsafe"
//go:linkname cipherSuiteByID github.com/metacubex/utls.cipherSuiteByID
func cipherSuiteByID(id uint16) unsafe.Pointer
//go:linkname keysFromMasterSecret github.com/metacubex/utls.keysFromMasterSecret
func keysFromMasterSecret(version uint16, suite unsafe.Pointer, masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte, macLen, keyLen, ivLen int) (clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV []byte)
//go:linkname cipherSuiteTLS13ByID github.com/metacubex/utls.cipherSuiteTLS13ByID
func cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id uint16) unsafe.Pointer
//go:linkname nextTrafficSecret github.com/metacubex/utls.(*cipherSuiteTLS13).nextTrafficSecret
func nextTrafficSecret(cs unsafe.Pointer, trafficSecret []byte) []byte
//go:linkname trafficKey github.com/metacubex/utls.(*cipherSuiteTLS13).trafficKey
func trafficKey(cs unsafe.Pointer, trafficSecret []byte) (key, iv []byte)

292
common/ktls/ktls_read.go Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build linux && go1.25 && !without_badtls
package ktls
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/tls"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
)
func (c *Conn) Read(b []byte) (int, error) {
if !c.kernelRx {
return c.Conn.Read(b)
}
if len(b) == 0 {
// Put this after Handshake, in case people were calling
// Read(nil) for the side effect of the Handshake.
return 0, nil
}
c.rawConn.In.Lock()
defer c.rawConn.In.Unlock()
for c.rawConn.Input.Len() == 0 {
if err := c.readRecord(); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
for c.rawConn.Hand.Len() > 0 {
if err := c.handlePostHandshakeMessage(); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
}
}
n, _ := c.rawConn.Input.Read(b)
// If a close-notify alert is waiting, read it so that we can return (n,
// EOF) instead of (n, nil), to signal to the HTTP response reading
// goroutine that the connection is now closed. This eliminates a race
// where the HTTP response reading goroutine would otherwise not observe
// the EOF until its next read, by which time a client goroutine might
// have already tried to reuse the HTTP connection for a new request.
// See https://golang.org/cl/76400046 and https://golang.org/issue/3514
if n != 0 && c.rawConn.Input.Len() == 0 && c.rawConn.RawInput.Len() > 0 &&
c.rawConn.RawInput.Bytes()[0] == recordTypeAlert {
if err := c.readRecord(); err != nil {
return n, err // will be io.EOF on closeNotify
}
}
return n, nil
}
func (c *Conn) readRecord() error {
if *c.rawConn.In.Err != nil {
return *c.rawConn.In.Err
}
typ, data, err := c.readRawRecord()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if len(data) > maxPlaintext {
return c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertRecordOverflow))
}
// Application Data messages are always protected.
if c.rawConn.In.Cipher == nil && typ == recordTypeApplicationData {
return c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
}
//if typ != recordTypeAlert && typ != recordTypeChangeCipherSpec && len(data) > 0 {
// This is a state-advancing message: reset the retry count.
// c.retryCount = 0
//}
// Handshake messages MUST NOT be interleaved with other record types in TLS 1.3.
if *c.rawConn.Vers == tls.VersionTLS13 && typ != recordTypeHandshake && c.rawConn.Hand.Len() > 0 {
return c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
}
switch typ {
default:
return c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
case recordTypeAlert:
//if c.quic != nil {
// return c.rawConn.In.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
//}
if len(data) != 2 {
return c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
}
if data[1] == alertCloseNotify {
return c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(io.EOF)
}
if *c.rawConn.Vers == tls.VersionTLS13 {
// TLS 1.3 removed warning-level alerts except for alertUserCanceled
// (RFC 8446, § 6.1). Since at least one major implementation
// (https://bugs.openjdk.org/browse/JDK-8323517) misuses this alert,
// many TLS stacks now ignore it outright when seen in a TLS 1.3
// handshake (e.g. BoringSSL, NSS, Rustls).
if data[1] == alertUserCanceled {
// Like TLS 1.2 alertLevelWarning alerts, we drop the record and retry.
return c.retryReadRecord( /*expectChangeCipherSpec*/ )
}
return c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(&net.OpError{Op: "remote error", Err: tls.AlertError(data[1])})
}
switch data[0] {
case alertLevelWarning:
// Drop the record on the floor and retry.
return c.retryReadRecord( /*expectChangeCipherSpec*/ )
case alertLevelError:
return c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(&net.OpError{Op: "remote error", Err: tls.AlertError(data[1])})
default:
return c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
}
case recordTypeChangeCipherSpec:
if len(data) != 1 || data[0] != 1 {
return c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError))
}
// Handshake messages are not allowed to fragment across the CCS.
if c.rawConn.Hand.Len() > 0 {
return c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
}
// In TLS 1.3, change_cipher_spec records are ignored until the
// Finished. See RFC 8446, Appendix D.4. Note that according to Section
// 5, a server can send a ChangeCipherSpec before its ServerHello, when
// c.vers is still unset. That's not useful though and suspicious if the
// server then selects a lower protocol version, so don't allow that.
if *c.rawConn.Vers == tls.VersionTLS13 {
return c.retryReadRecord( /*expectChangeCipherSpec*/ )
}
// if !expectChangeCipherSpec {
return c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
//}
//if err := c.rawConn.In.changeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
// return c.rawConn.In.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(err.(alert)))
//}
case recordTypeApplicationData:
// Some OpenSSL servers send empty records in order to randomize the
// CBC RawIV. Ignore a limited number of empty records.
if len(data) == 0 {
return c.retryReadRecord( /*expectChangeCipherSpec*/ )
}
// Note that data is owned by c.rawInput, following the Next call above,
// to avoid copying the plaintext. This is safe because c.rawInput is
// not read from or written to until c.input is drained.
c.rawConn.Input.Reset(data)
case recordTypeHandshake:
if len(data) == 0 {
return c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
}
c.rawConn.Hand.Write(data)
}
return nil
}
//nolint:staticcheck
func (c *Conn) readRawRecord() (typ uint8, data []byte, err error) {
// Read from kernel.
if c.kernelRx {
return c.readKernelRecord()
}
// Read header, payload.
if err = c.readFromUntil(c.conn, recordHeaderLen); err != nil {
// RFC 8446, Section 6.1 suggests that EOF without an alertCloseNotify
// is an error, but popular web sites seem to do this, so we accept it
// if and only if at the record boundary.
if err == io.ErrUnexpectedEOF && c.rawConn.RawInput.Len() == 0 {
err = io.EOF
}
if e, ok := err.(net.Error); !ok || !e.Temporary() {
c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(err)
}
return
}
hdr := c.rawConn.RawInput.Bytes()[:recordHeaderLen]
typ = hdr[0]
vers := uint16(hdr[1])<<8 | uint16(hdr[2])
expectedVers := *c.rawConn.Vers
if expectedVers == tls.VersionTLS13 {
// All TLS 1.3 records are expected to have 0x0303 (1.2) after
// the initial hello (RFC 8446 Section 5.1).
expectedVers = tls.VersionTLS12
}
n := int(hdr[3])<<8 | int(hdr[4])
if /*c.haveVers && */ vers != expectedVers {
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
msg := fmt.Sprintf("received record with version %x when expecting version %x", vers, expectedVers)
err = c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(c.newRecordHeaderError(nil, msg))
return
}
//if !c.haveVers {
// // First message, be extra suspicious: this might not be a TLS
// // client. Bail out before reading a full 'body', if possible.
// // The current max version is 3.3 so if the version is >= 16.0,
// // it's probably not real.
// if (typ != recordTypeAlert && typ != recordTypeHandshake) || vers >= 0x1000 {
// err = c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(c.newRecordHeaderError(c.conn, "first record does not look like a TLS handshake"))
// return
// }
//}
if *c.rawConn.Vers == tls.VersionTLS13 && n > maxCiphertextTLS13 || n > maxCiphertext {
c.sendAlert(alertRecordOverflow)
msg := fmt.Sprintf("oversized record received with length %d", n)
err = c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(c.newRecordHeaderError(nil, msg))
return
}
if err = c.readFromUntil(c.conn, recordHeaderLen+n); err != nil {
if e, ok := err.(net.Error); !ok || !e.Temporary() {
c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(err)
}
return
}
// Process message.
record := c.rawConn.RawInput.Next(recordHeaderLen + n)
data, typ, err = c.rawConn.In.Decrypt(record)
if err != nil {
err = c.rawConn.In.SetErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(uint8(err.(tls.AlertError))))
return
}
return
}
// retryReadRecord recurs into readRecordOrCCS to drop a non-advancing record, like
// a warning alert, empty application_data, or a change_cipher_spec in TLS 1.3.
func (c *Conn) retryReadRecord( /*expectChangeCipherSpec bool*/ ) error {
//c.retryCount++
//if c.retryCount > maxUselessRecords {
// c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
// return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: too many ignored records"))
//}
return c.readRecord( /*expectChangeCipherSpec*/ )
}
// atLeastReader reads from R, stopping with EOF once at least N bytes have been
// read. It is different from an io.LimitedReader in that it doesn't cut short
// the last Read call, and in that it considers an early EOF an error.
type atLeastReader struct {
R io.Reader
N int64
}
func (r *atLeastReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
if r.N <= 0 {
return 0, io.EOF
}
n, err := r.R.Read(p)
r.N -= int64(n) // won't underflow unless len(p) >= n > 9223372036854775809
if r.N > 0 && err == io.EOF {
return n, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
if r.N <= 0 && err == nil {
return n, io.EOF
}
return n, err
}
// readFromUntil reads from r into c.rawConn.RawInput until c.rawConn.RawInput contains
// at least n bytes or else returns an error.
func (c *Conn) readFromUntil(r io.Reader, n int) error {
if c.rawConn.RawInput.Len() >= n {
return nil
}
needs := n - c.rawConn.RawInput.Len()
// There might be extra input waiting on the wire. Make a best effort
// attempt to fetch it so that it can be used in (*Conn).Read to
// "predict" closeNotify alerts.
c.rawConn.RawInput.Grow(needs + bytes.MinRead)
_, err := c.rawConn.RawInput.ReadFrom(&atLeastReader{r, int64(needs)})
return err
}
func (c *Conn) newRecordHeaderError(conn net.Conn, msg string) (err tls.RecordHeaderError) {
err.Msg = msg
err.Conn = conn
copy(err.RecordHeader[:], c.rawConn.RawInput.Bytes())
return err
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build linux && go1.25 && !without_badtls
package ktls
import (
"github.com/sagernet/sing/common/buf"
N "github.com/sagernet/sing/common/network"
)
func (c *Conn) InitializeReadWaiter(options N.ReadWaitOptions) (needCopy bool) {
c.readWaitOptions = options
return false
}
func (c *Conn) WaitReadBuffer() (buffer *buf.Buffer, err error) {
c.rawConn.In.Lock()
defer c.rawConn.In.Unlock()
for c.rawConn.Input.Len() == 0 {
err = c.readRecord()
if err != nil {
return
}
}
buffer = c.readWaitOptions.NewBuffer()
n, err := c.rawConn.Input.Read(buffer.FreeBytes())
if err != nil {
buffer.Release()
return
}
buffer.Truncate(n)
if n != 0 && c.rawConn.Input.Len() == 0 && c.rawConn.Input.Len() > 0 &&
c.rawConn.RawInput.Bytes()[0] == recordTypeAlert {
_ = c.rawConn.ReadRecord()
}
c.readWaitOptions.PostReturn(buffer)
return
}

15
common/ktls/ktls_stub.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
//go:build !linux || !go1.25 || without_badtls
package ktls
import (
"context"
"os"
"github.com/sagernet/sing/common/logger"
aTLS "github.com/sagernet/sing/common/tls"
)
func NewConn(ctx context.Context, logger logger.ContextLogger, conn aTLS.Conn, txOffload, rxOffload bool) (aTLS.Conn, error) {
return nil, os.ErrInvalid
}

154
common/ktls/ktls_write.go Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build linux && go1.25 && !without_badtls
package ktls
import (
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/tls"
"errors"
"net"
)
func (c *Conn) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
if !c.kernelTx {
return c.Conn.Write(b)
}
// interlock with Close below
for {
x := c.rawConn.ActiveCall.Load()
if x&1 != 0 {
return 0, net.ErrClosed
}
if c.rawConn.ActiveCall.CompareAndSwap(x, x+2) {
break
}
}
defer c.rawConn.ActiveCall.Add(-2)
//if err := c.Conn.HandshakeContext(context.Background()); err != nil {
// return 0, err
//}
c.rawConn.Out.Lock()
defer c.rawConn.Out.Unlock()
if err := *c.rawConn.Out.Err; err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if !c.rawConn.IsHandshakeComplete.Load() {
return 0, tls.AlertError(alertInternalError)
}
if *c.rawConn.CloseNotifySent {
// return 0, errShutdown
return 0, errors.New("tls: protocol is shutdown")
}
// TLS 1.0 is susceptible to a chosen-plaintext
// attack when using block mode ciphers due to predictable IVs.
// This can be prevented by splitting each Application Data
// record into two records, effectively randomizing the RawIV.
//
// https://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt
// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=665814
// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/01/15/beastfollowup.html
var m int
if len(b) > 1 && *c.rawConn.Vers == tls.VersionTLS10 {
if _, ok := (*c.rawConn.Out.Cipher).(cipher.BlockMode); ok {
n, err := c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeApplicationData, b[:1])
if err != nil {
return n, c.rawConn.Out.SetErrorLocked(err)
}
m, b = 1, b[1:]
}
}
n, err := c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeApplicationData, b)
return n + m, c.rawConn.Out.SetErrorLocked(err)
}
func (c *Conn) writeRecordLocked(typ uint16, data []byte) (n int, err error) {
if !c.kernelTx {
return c.rawConn.WriteRecordLocked(typ, data)
}
/*for len(data) > 0 {
m := len(data)
if maxPayload := c.maxPayloadSizeForWrite(typ); m > maxPayload {
m = maxPayload
}
_, err = c.writeKernelRecord(typ, data[:m])
if err != nil {
return
}
n += m
data = data[m:]
}*/
return c.writeKernelRecord(typ, data)
}
const (
// tcpMSSEstimate is a conservative estimate of the TCP maximum segment
// size (MSS). A constant is used, rather than querying the kernel for
// the actual MSS, to avoid complexity. The value here is the IPv6
// minimum MTU (1280 bytes) minus the overhead of an IPv6 header (40
// bytes) and a TCP header with timestamps (32 bytes).
tcpMSSEstimate = 1208
// recordSizeBoostThreshold is the number of bytes of application data
// sent after which the TLS record size will be increased to the
// maximum.
recordSizeBoostThreshold = 128 * 1024
)
func (c *Conn) maxPayloadSizeForWrite(typ uint16) int {
if /*c.config.DynamicRecordSizingDisabled ||*/ typ != recordTypeApplicationData {
return maxPlaintext
}
if *c.rawConn.PacketsSent >= recordSizeBoostThreshold {
return maxPlaintext
}
// Subtract TLS overheads to get the maximum payload size.
payloadBytes := tcpMSSEstimate - recordHeaderLen - c.rawConn.Out.ExplicitNonceLen()
if rawCipher := *c.rawConn.Out.Cipher; rawCipher != nil {
switch ciph := rawCipher.(type) {
case cipher.Stream:
payloadBytes -= (*c.rawConn.Out.Mac).Size()
case cipher.AEAD:
payloadBytes -= ciph.Overhead()
/*case cbcMode:
blockSize := ciph.BlockSize()
// The payload must fit in a multiple of blockSize, with
// room for at least one padding byte.
payloadBytes = (payloadBytes & ^(blockSize - 1)) - 1
// The RawMac is appended before padding so affects the
// payload size directly.
payloadBytes -= c.out.mac.Size()*/
default:
panic("unknown cipher type")
}
}
if *c.rawConn.Vers == tls.VersionTLS13 {
payloadBytes-- // encrypted ContentType
}
// Allow packet growth in arithmetic progression up to max.
pkt := *c.rawConn.PacketsSent
*c.rawConn.PacketsSent++
if pkt > 1000 {
return maxPlaintext // avoid overflow in multiply below
}
n := payloadBytes * int(pkt+1)
if n > maxPlaintext {
n = maxPlaintext
}
return n
}